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CASE COMMENTS
LIMITING PARENT UNION LIABILITY FOR LOCAL
UNION WILDCAT STRIKES
Carbon Fuel Company v. United Mine Workers of
America, 444 U.S. 212 (1979)
"Up here on the creek, nobody tells me when to work and when not to
work."' Mike Adkins, UMWA member.
The Supreme Court, in Carbon Fuel Company v. United Mine Work-
ers of America,2 resolved a disagreement among the circuits3 by insu-
lating an international union and its regional subdivision from liability
for their local unions' 4 unauthorized wildcat strikes.5
Three local unions of the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA)6 engaged in forty-eight wildcat strikes at the Carbon Fuel
1. The Coal Miners Walk Out, TIME, Dec. 12, 1977, at 72, 74.
2. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
3. See notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text.
4. For a description of the structure of UMWA, see Hodgson v. UMWA, 344 F. Supp. 990
(D.D.C. 1972) (mem. op.); M. FORKOSCH, TREATISE ON LABOR LAw 300, 300-03 (1953).
5. A "'wildcat strike" is defined as a work stoppage, generally spontaneous in character, by a
group of union employees without authorization or approval. It may exist when a local union has
supported a strike but has not received the approval of the national or international union. Such
action generally is in violation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. H. ROBERTS,
ROBERTS' DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 582 (1971). If an international union autho-
rizes a strike in violation of any term of the agreement, whether express or implied, it will be held
responsible. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
A wildcat strike should be distinguished from a concerted work stoppage protected by § 7 of the
Taft-Hartley Act. See Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The rights of
protected strikers depend on the cause of the strike. A work stoppage protesting employer conduct
found by the National Labor Relations Board to be in violation of the Labor Act is termed an
unfair labor practice strike. A strike for another reason, typically in support of bargaining de-
mands regarding wages and working conditions, or requests that the employer recognize a union,
is termed an economic strike. See R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 339-41 (1977). Discharge of either
an economic or unfair labor practice striker violates §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972). An unfair labor practice striker must, upon
an unconditional request for reinstatement, be reinstated to his original position. Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). An economic striker can be permanently replaced and is not
entitled to oust his or her replacement upon the termination of the strike. NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). A wildcat striker loses statutory protection unless the
strike is directed toward a specific, previously articulated union objective. NLRB v. Shop Rite
Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970), noted in 49 TEX. L. REV. 943 (1971).
6. The UMWA rank and file is renowned for its militancy. See generally J. FINLEY, THE
CORRUPT KINGDOM: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS (1972); B. HtME,
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Company mines from 1969 to 1973. District 17,7 a regional subdivision
of UMWA, unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the miners to return
to work.' The company petitioned the trial court for injunctive relief9
and damages from UMWA, District 17, and the local unions. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's judgments' °
against UMWA and District 17, holding that neither could be liable for
damages unless they adopted, encouraged, or prolonged the strikes. A
unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision and
held- A parent union is liable for a local union's unauthorized strike
only (1) if the parent union would be liable under the common-law rule
of agency or (2) if the parent union explicitly promises in the collective
bargaining agreement to attempt to prevent unauthorized strikes."
DEATH AND THE MINES; REBELLION AND MURDER IN THE UNITED MINE WORKERS (1971). In
recent years, the UMWA has plagued the the bitumimous coal industry with wildcat strikes. 80
W. VA. L. REv. 492 (1978). In 1976, the UMWA engaged in 1,132 wildcat strikes, one fourth of all
industrial disputes in the United States. Hoerr, The UMfWIs Bargaining From Weakness, Bus,
WEEK, No. 2514, Dec. 19, 1971, at 30. In 1977, the coal industry lost a record 2.28 million tons of
coal production during wildcat strikes. Fading Power of Mine Workers Union, 87 U.S. NEws AND
WORLD REP. July 23, 1979, at 64-65.
Wildcat strikes are said to be symptomatic of the growing restiveness of rank and file workers,
Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations 4ct,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967). Professor Gould attributes rank and file restlessness to inflationary
economic conditions, the Landrum-Griffin Act's preoccupation with the individual's rights against
his or her union and the rise of industry-wide and multi-enterprise bargaining in the United
States. Id. at 674. See also S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 633-91, 926 (1960).
7. District 17, comprised of 25,000 miners in southern West Virginia, is termed "the biggest,
brashest, most uncontrollable and most defiant of the union's twenty-one districts." TIME, Dec.
12, 1977, at 72.
8. Wildcat strikes threaten an incumbent union's interests through deterioration of internal
discipline and erosion of employer confidence, with consequent undermining of the union's stabil-
ity and strength. Cantor, Dissident Worker Action, After "The Emporium", 29 RUTGERS L. REV.
35 (1975); Comment, Parent Union Liability/or Strikes in Breach of Contract, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
1028, 1044 (1979). However, Professor Archibald Cox suggests that while wildcat strikes may
disrupt plant relationships and interfere with the normal processes of collective bargaining, "much
can be said in favor of aggressive unions whose leaders are consistently pricked to action by
militant minorities." Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted,4ctivitIes, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 332
(1951).
9. Because the contracts had expired at the time the case reached the Supreme Court, there
was no question of injunctive relief. 444 U.S. at 214, n.2.
10. The Fourth Circuit vacated in part judgments against the three local unions. Carbon
Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1978). Review ofjudgments against the three locals
was not sought in the Supreme Court. 444 U.S. at 215, n.3.
11. Id. at 218-19. The 1968 and 1971 collective bargaining agreement contained a provision
promising to maintain the contract. The following provision was held inadequate to hold the
parent union liable:
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Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act12 provides
that suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, negotiated by
a union representing employees in an industry affecting commerce,
may be maintained against the union as an entity in federal courts. 13
Mandatory grievance and arbitration provisions 4 provide a basis for
the judicial imposition of an implied no strike clause.15 An employer
may recover damages for breach of contract, such as the violation of a
no strike clause,' 6 in a § 301(a) proceeding.
The United Mine Workers of America and the Operators agree and affirm that they will
maintain the integrity of this contract and that all disputes and claims which are not
settled by agreement shall be settled by the machinery provided in the Settlement of
Local and District Disputes' section of the Agreement unless national in character in
which event the parties shall settle such disputes by free collective bargaining as hereto-
fore practiced in the industry, it being the purpose of this provision to provide for the
settlement of all such disputes and claims through the machinery in this contract pro-
vided and by collective bargaining without recourse to the courts.
Id. at 221. (quoting the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
13. At common law, labor organizations, being unincorporated associations, could not be
sued as separate entities. E.g., Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local 2928, United Steelwork-
ers, 152 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1945). See Witmer, Trade Union Liability.- The Problem of the Unincor-
porated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40 (1941); 32 VA. L. REv. 394 (1946). Before the enactment of
§ 301, only state courts, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, had jurisdiction over suits for a
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, all rights and remedies related thereto
were determined by state law. See A. Cox & D. BOK, LABOR LAW 597 (7th ed. 1969). As Con-
gress noted, the various procedural expedients which existed in many states were, as a practical
matter, too fortuitous to be adequate. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public We/fare on S. 1126 and S. 55, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1914 (1947).
Section 301 was enacted primarily to make collective bargaining agreements binding and en-
forceable on both the employer and the union, as well as eliminating procedural defects by treat-
ing unions as entities for the purpose of actions to recover damages for breach of contract. See
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485 app. (1957); 93 CONG. REC. 3839 (1947)
(remarks of Sen. Taft); Id. at 6283 (remarks of Rep. Case); Id. at 5014 (remarks of Sen. Ball).
Section 301 is more than jurisdictional; it authorizes the federal courts to fashion a body of federal
substantive law from the policy of our national labor laws for the enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements. The substantive judicial doctrines formulated under § 301 are paramount and
preempt all state law. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14. See note 11 supra.
15. The implied no strike clause would cover the same topics as the grievance-arbitration
provision. Each promise is the quid pro quo for the other because the employer relinquishes some
managerial autonomy in exchange for a period of industrial peace. See Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449, 455 (1957).
16. The measure of damages is the actual losses sustained as a natural result of the breach of
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. E.g., United Electrical, Radio & Mach.
Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse
Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1960). The usual type of damages, called "standby ex-
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The Taft-Hartley Act provides in § 301(b), to effectuate the intent of
§ 301(a), 17 that a union "shall be bound by the acts of its agents"' 8 and
in § 301(e) that the common law of agency shall govern "in determin-
ing whether one person is acting as an 'agent' for another person."' 9
Federal courts developed discordant standards for determining the ex-
tent of a parent union's responsibility for a local union's unauthorized
strike under sections_301(b) and (e). Some courts adopted the "all rea-
sonable means" doctrine and imposed a duty on a union to use all rea-
sonable means to end a wildcat strike staged by its members.20 Other
courts held a union responsible for the mass action of its members,
despite the union's contention that it had not authorized a strike.2' The
Sixth Circuit imposed liability on a union for authorized or ratified
actions of its agents and absolved a union from liability in the absence
of union initiation, authorization, or encouragement of a wildcat
penses," consist of: overhead, fixed charges, salaries of paid supervisory personnel, property in-
surance, property tax, compensation and group insurance premiums, social security tax and
employee pension payments that were paid despite lack of production. See, e.g., United Steel-
workers v. CCI Corp., 395 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1968); United Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v,
Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Dahlem
Constr. Co., 193 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir. 1951); Union Tank Car Co. v. General Truck Drivers
Local 5, 309 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. La. 1970); Structural Steel Ass'n v. Shopmen's Local 545, 172 F.
Supp. 354, 360-62 (D.N.J. 1959). Overhead may consist of idle equipment, lost profits and antici-
pated lost profits. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107, 299 F.
Supp. 1058 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (loss of use, lost and anticipated profits); Denver & Rio Grande R.R.
v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 58 L.R.R.M. 2568 (D. Colo. 1965) (lost profits); Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955) (fair rental value of idle
machinery considered loss of use). For an extensive survey of damages elements see Spelfogel,
Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Action and Dscopllne, 17 LAD. L.J. 67, 78-
79 (1966).
Because the statute does not expressly provide for punitive damages, it is unlikely they will be
awarded in § 301 actions. The statute's function is remedial, rather than punitive. See United
Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
17. See note 13 supra.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976).
19. Id. § 185(e).
20. See Bituminous Coal Operators v. UMWA, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978); Republic Steel
Corp. v. UMWA, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978), notedin 24 VILL. L. REv. 369 (1978-79); 31 VAND.
L. REv. 706 (1978); United States Steel v. UMWA, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976); Eazor Express,
Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), notedin 89 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1976), 26 VAND. L.
REv. 1331 (1975) and 19 VILL. L. Rev. 665 (1974); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, 496 F.2d
954 (8th Cir. 1974).
21. See, e.g., Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, 496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974); Vulcan Materi-
als Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446,455 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971);
United States v. UMWA, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), a f'don other grounds, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
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strike.22 The Fourth Circuit applied a similar standard and exculpated
the international union from liability unless it adopted, encouraged, or
prolonged the unauthorized strike.23
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Carbon Fuel Co. v., UMWA,
found that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act revealed a
clear congressional intention to impose liability on unions for strikes in
breach of their contract only when the union would be responsible
under the common-law rule of agency.24 To hold the international
union liable for failure to fulfill an affirmative duty in response to its
22. See North Am. Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMWA, 497 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1974); Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. UMWA, 436 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971);
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), aft'dby an equally divided court, 361
U.S. 454 (1960); Garmeada Coal Co. v. UMWA, 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956). But see Teamsters
Local 984 v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1961) (international becomes liable when
local officials are instigators because local is mere administrative subdivision of the international);
UMWA v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960) (interna-
tional received benefits in the form of dues and as a real party in interest to the breached contract,
held liable although no international union officials were present when strike occurred).
23. See United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 847 (1955). Accord, e.g., Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958),
modoed, 361 U.S. 459 (1959); Garmeada Coal Co. v. UMWA, 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956); Local
25, Teamsters v. W.L. Mead Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), ceri. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); UMWA
v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver, 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.
1953); Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950).
24. The Court quoted Senator Taft's explanation of § 301(e):
If the wife of a man who is working at a plant receives a lot of telephone messages,
very likely it cannot be proved that they came from the union. There is no case then,
there must be legal proof of agency in the case of Unions as in the case of corporations.
93 CoNrG. REC. 4022 (1947), quoted in 444 U.S. at 217.
Prior to 1947, application of the common-law agency doctrine as a means of finding union
liability was complicated by union disclaimers and exculpatory provisions in labor contracts and
union constitutions disavowing responsibility for the unauthorized acts of union functionaries and
declaring such functionaries without authority to initiate or maintain strikes. Congress responded
in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) in 1947. Sections 301(b) and (e) were designed
to apply the doctrine of agency law, including the doctrine of apparent authority, to unions,
notwithstanding resolutions and exculpatory provisions disclaiming responsibility for union func-
tionaries. See United Steelworkers v. CCI Corp., 395 F.2d 529, 532 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1019 (1969); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955). Section 301(e) specifically overrules the Supreme Court's decision in
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947), that unions are liable only for
conduct actually authorized or subsequently ratified, and not for all acts taken by agents in the
course of their employment. See 93 CONG. REc. 6608 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act requires "clear proof' of union instigation, participation
or ratification to establish union responsibility for a smaller entity's actions. 29 U.S.C. § 4106
(1976). See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 403 (1947). Although § 6
has not been repealed, Congress restricted its application to cases arising outside the LMRA.
Union responsibility under § 301 was not to be governed by the more stringent "clear proof"
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locals' actions would be anomalous in the face of the shield Congress
constructed.25 Carbon Fuel Company failed to present evidence that
the district or international union instigated, supported, ratified, or en-
couraged any of the work stoppages.26 The company thus failed to
prove agency as required by sections 301(b) and (e).27
The Court rejected the company's argument that the union's promise
to maintain the contract28 was meaningless because UMWA and Dis-
trict 17 had no obligation to employ their best efforts to force miners to
abide by their contracts.29 The UMWA had negotiated the deletion of
language from the collective bargaining agreement that would have re-
quired each side to "exercise their best efforts through available meas-
ures to prevent stoppages of work by strike."30 The union and
company thus specifically resolved the issue of the union's obligation to
persuade unauthorized strikers to return to work. Federal labor policy
favoring free collective bargaining3 ' does not allow the courts to substi-
standard of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736
(1966); Mason-Rust v. Laborers' Local 42, 435 F.2d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 1970).
25. 444 U.S. at 216.
26. The Supreme Court noted that the UMWA had repeatedly expressed its opposition to
wildcat strikes. The Court cited Art. XVI § I of the UMWA constitution, which provides that
local unions lack authority to strike without authorization from the UMWA. Id. at 218.
27. Id.
28. See note 11 supra.
29. 444 U.S. at 219.
30. The union did not want to surrender its freedom to decide what measure to take or not to
take in dealing with an unauthorized strike. Id. at 220; International Union, UMWA v. NLRB,
257 F.2d 211, 216-17 (1958); International Union, UMWA, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095, 1118 (1957) (Inter-
mediate Report of Trial Examiner, reprinted as an appendix to NLRB opinion).
31. This policy was one of the numerous policies of particular importance that Congress
sought to promote in the Taft-Hartley Act. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212,218-19
(1979); Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962); NLRB v. Insurance Agents
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-
54 (1957). In Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., the Court stated that "[t]he ordering and ad-
justing of competing interests through a process of free and collective bargaining is the keystone of
the federal scheme to promote industrial peace."
In § 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress made "crystal clear the intention to leave the parties
entirely free of any government compulsion to agree to a proposal, or even reach an agreement
. .. 444 U.S. at 217. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 254-55
(1976). Section 8(d) defines "to bargain collectively" as not to compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Congress thereby
"intended that the parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any
governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of their differences." NLRB v. Insurance
Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960). 4ccord, Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
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tute a different resolution.32
The Supreme Court, in Carbon Fuel Company v. UMV.4,3 3 declared
a policy regarding an international union's liability for wildcat strikes
that recognizes the realities of union structure, 4 collective bargaining
agreements, and damage actions. The deterrent effect of imposing lia-
bility on a parent union for a local union's conduct is valuable only if
the international union has actual control over the conduct of its
subordinate organization and if imposition of liability might encourage
the development of responsible union conduct.3 5  A parent union's
ability to control a local union 36 is impeded, however, by the number
and size of local unions,37 and the quality and frequency of a local's
contact with its parent.38  The power of the international union to con-
trol a local union's conduct is subject to the ultimate political limitation
of assent to the international union's authority.39
The "all reasonable means" doctrine' creates a dilemma for union
officials by creating a conffict between their duty to respond to the
Executive Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1974); NLRB v. Bums Se-
curity Services, 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972); Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
The parties' collective bargaining agreement primarily determines their relationship. 444 U.S.
at 219; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Professor Cox suggests that the LMRA, "while it appears to reject the policy of encouraging
the spread of collective bargaining, accepts the institution where it already exists as a method by
which a large proportion of industrial life is ruled, and attempts to share its operation so as to
increase its effectiveness and reduce its cost." Cox, Some Aspects ofthe Labor Management Rela-
tions.Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 274 (1948).
32. 444 U.S. at 219.
33. Id. at 410.
34. Judicial notice can be taken of the framework of industrial and craft unions and the
extent of the international and local unions. Farnsworth & Chambers, Co. v. Sheet Metal Work-
ers, Local 99, 125 F. Supp. 830 (D.N.M. 1954).
35. See Evans, The Law of ,4gency and the National Union, 49 Ky. L.J. 295 (1961).
36. The overwhelming weight of judicial authority is that a local union is a legal entity apart
from its international. See cases cited in International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 121 N.L.R.B.
143, 146 n.3, 42 L.R.R.M. 1301, 1303 n.3 (1958).
37. Many parent unions oversee thousands of local unions. See, e.g., M. HoROwlTZ, THE
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE CARPENTER'S UNION 9 (1962). Local unions vary greatly
in size and sovereignty. In 1961, one article counted 60-70,000 locals, some of which had as many
as 40,000 members. See Evans, supra note 35, at 312.
38. A parent union seldom deals closely with one local. See generally D. BOK & J. DUNLOP,
LABOR & THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970). Some locals have only a loose affiliation with the
national union, paying only a per capita tax and can withdraw from the national union at will.
Evans, supra note 35, at 312.
39. See Evans, supra note 35, at 322.
40. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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membership's wishes41 and to avoid unfair labor practice charges.42
Administration of harsh disciplinary measures may exacerbate faction-
alism within the union, thus undercutting support for union leader-
ship.43 Furthermore, a union compelled to take drastic steps may lose
its credibility with wildcat strikers and jeopardize its own ability to end
the walkout.4" A strict "all reasonable means" standard deprives union
leadership of the flexibility to adjust to the political dynamics of a wild-
cat strike by selecting a productive method to inspire responsible con-
duct.45 The underlying reasons for a wildcat strike may lie with the
management, the community, the economy, or other forces beyond the
union's control.46 The "all reasonable means" standard is, thus, im-
practical and unworkable.
Substantive freedom in collective bargaining agreements47 thwarts
the implication of a duty, such as that urged by Carbon Fuel Company,
that is not expressly provided in the agreement. 48 A collective bargain-
ing agreement is neither an ordinary contract49 nor a commitment of
specific performance by either party. Unions make a commitment in
a collective bargaining agreement to encourage compliance, not to
guarantee performance, because the power to perform rests beyond the
control of union leaders. 51
41. Section 501 of the Landrum-Griffin Act imposes fiduciary duties on all union officials,
and § 501(b) gives union members a right or private deriviative action against union officials for
breach of that duty. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976). The Eighth Circuit held that § 501 requires union
officers to obey the orders of the membership. Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
42. It is an unfair labor practice for a union to enforce its membership obligations so as to
prejudice an employee's rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976). See Radio Officer's Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1954); Whitman, Wildcat Strikes. The Unions' Narrowing Path to
Rectitude, 50 IND. L.J. 472, 480-81 (1975).
43., See Whitman, supra note 42, at 481-82; Gould, supra note 6 at 674; 89 HARv. L. REv.
601, 608 (1976); 26 VAND. L. REv. 1331, 1335 (1973).
44. See Whitman, supra note 42, at 481; Gould, supra note 6 at 701; 89 HARv. L. Rav. 601,
supra note 43 at 608.
45. See Whitman, supra note 42, at 481-82; Gould, supra note 6 at 701-02; 89 HARv. L. Rv.
601, supra note 43 at 607.
46. See Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
829, 841-42 (1948).
47. See note 31 supra.
48. See Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 524-25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850
(1972); 89 HAgv. L. Rav. 601, supra note 43, at 607.
49. Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 524-25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972).
50. See Chamberlain, supra note 46.
51. Id.
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Damage actions against the union generate friction52 and induce
financial ruin. 3 The imposition of liability on the union shifts an em-
ployer's losses to workers who may have not been involved with the
wildcat strike and may have been powerless to end it. 4 A potential
damage action might unduly restrain employee freedom to engage in
concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection.
The parent union nevertheless can exercise some control over the lo-
cal union. It may impose internal union discipline on recalcitrant un-
authorized strikes.56 An international union can effectively control the
local union by placing the local in trusteeship. 7  In practical effect,
however, a union is not likely to take such disciplinary measures to end
the strike unless the union is directly named by the wildcat strikers.5 8
An employer also can exercise certain powers to end a wildcat strike. 9
52. See Shearer, Legal Remedies and Practical Considerations in Dealing with a Wildcat
Strike, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 46 (1972); Comment, Parent Union Liability for Strikes in Breach of
Contract, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1028, 1033 (1979).
53. This policy was a major impetus to the enactment of§ 301(b). See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Oil
Workers Int'l, 452 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1971), noted in 6 GA. L. REV. 797 (1972); 93 CONG. REc.
4893-40 (1947); 92 CoNG. REc. 5705 (1946). This policy is as compelling in an unauthorized strike
situation as in an authorized strike. See 86 HARv. L. REV. 447, 452 (1972).
54. See 86 HARv. L. REV. 447, 456 (1976). Such a shift would give a minority of the workers
undue power to financially impair a satisfied majority. Id.
55. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). For example, if a minority of union members believe that
their employer has committed an unfair labor practice and their union is not adequately repre-
senting the employees' interest, an employee strike would be a protected activity under § 7 of the
LMRA. The possibility of extensive damage liability if the strikers are wrong in their evaluation
of the employer's conduct may promote excessive caution in the exercise of statutorily protected
rights. See 86 HARv. L. REv. at 451-52.
56. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1065-66
(1951).
Union constitutions frequently permit a parent union to discipline its members for acts violating
the constitution including contractual obligations. See, e.g., Pearl v. Tarantola, 361 F. Supp. 288
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Prof. Cantor argues that since a wildcat strike chiefly harms the union's interests, internal union
discipline, rather than employer retaliation, should be the only permissible response to wildcat
activity. See Cantor, note 8 supra at 61.
57. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2318, 2333. Section 302 of the Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 462 (1976), permits trusteeships over locals to ensure, inter alia "the performance of collective
bargaining agreements," i.e., no strike clauses. Trusteeships were sustained in illegal strike situa-
tions in Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971); Local 238, Laborer's Int'l
Union v. FOSCO, 80 L.R.R.M. 2087 (E.D. Wash. 1972).
58. See United States v. Railroad Trainmen, 27 L.R.R.M. 2308 (N.D. Ill. 1951); 6 GA. L.
REV. 797, 803 (1972).
59. The Supreme Court has stated that if the grievance-arbitration procedure is opened to
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The employer may have a damage action against the local union.60 An
employer can discharge61  or discipline 62 unauthorized strikers, al-
though this remedy is subject to a prohibition against disparate treat-
company grievances, the company loses its right to obtain money damages in court for a strike in
violation of a no strike pledge. Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). See
Fairweather, Use of Presumptions to Establish the Tort of Instigation of Strikers in Breach of Con-
tract, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1965). The remedy of contract rescission has been disclaimed by the
Court. Local 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964). Since rescission would only
terminate the agreement temporarily, the employer would be forced to renegotiate the collective
bargaining agreement because the representation rights of the union would usually remain after
rescission. See Fairweather, supra.
60. The Supreme Court, in Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), held that an
action under § 301 of the NLRA would lie for an alleged breach of a union's no strike promise,
The Court also held that § 301(b) had made it clear that no cause of action for damages can be
stated against union officials or members personally for participating in an unlawful strike author-
ized by the union. Section 301(b), embodying congressional distaste for money judgments en-
forceable directly against individual workers, also bars an action against employees who engage in
a work stoppage in violation of a no strike clause when that stoppage is a wildcat strike authorized
by and against the orders of the union. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.
1971), notedin 6 GA. L. REv. 797 (1972); 38 Mo. L. REV. 128 (1972). See Note, 18 WAYNE L. RMV.
1657 (1972) (advocating individual liability). See generally Givens, Responsibility of Individual
Employeesfor Breaches of No Strike Clauses, 14 IND. & LABOR REL. REv. 595 (1961).
One court has held that an employer may recover damages from individual strikers who partici-
pate in a wildcat strike on a tort theory of interference with business. See Louisville & Nashville
Ry. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958). See generally Fair-
weather, supra note 59. This holding has been severely criticized and may not represent a correct
statement of the law. See Givens, supra; Note, Employer Remedies for Breach of No Strike
Clauses, 39 IND. L.J 387 (1964); Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 177 (1959). It is likely that an
individual union member would be unable to satisfy a judgment against him/her. Note, Employer
Remediesfor Breach of No Strike Clauses, 39 IND. L.J. 387 (1964).
61. Unless strikes in breach of contract are prompted by an unfair labor practice, they are not
protected activity and discharge is an available remedy. E.g., NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S.
332 (1939).
A potential problem exists when appointed and elected officials are removed. They may argue
that their discharge is a reprisal for exercise of their Title I, Landrum-Griffin membership rights,
e.g., their opposition to the leadership's position on the substantive bargaining matters which led
to the strike. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1976); Erelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the Lan-
drum-Grffin Act, 82 HARv. L. REv. 727,737 (1969); Whitman, supra note 42 at 482,484; 89 HARv.
L. Rav. 601 (1976). Reprisal for the exercise of Title I membership rights is actionable under
§ 609 of the Landrum-Griffin Act. 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1976). See, e.g., Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d
899 (2d Cir. 1973).
While most arbitrators consider employee participation in an unauthorized strike sufficient
cause for discharge, arbitrators have specifically examined the following circumstances as bearing
on the propriety of discharge:
1) the familiarity of the employee with his/her obligation, Armour Creamers, 31 Lab. Arb. 291
(1958) (Kelliher, Arb.);
2) the past practice of the employer, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 65 Lab. Arb. 15 (1975)
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ment when employees exhibit varying degrees of guilt.3 Section 301
confers on the federal courts the authority to use their equitable powers
to issue an injunction prohibiting an unauthorized strike,64 thus en-
abling an employer to quickly restore production. Some employers
have made effective use of grievance arbitration procedures to obtain
(Garrett, Arb.); Granite City Steel Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 909 (1969) (McKenna, Arb.); National Gyp-
sum Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 114 (1960) (Abernathy, Arb.);
3) the extent of participation, e.g., Union Carbide Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. 1159 (1970) (Williams,
Arb.); Border Chem. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 114 (1959) (Wallen, Arb.);
4) the status of the employee in the union organization, e.g., George S. Carrington Co., 57 Lab.
Arb. 1109 (1971) (Volz, Arb.); American Smelting & Ref. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 575 (1959) (Kotin,
Arb.);
5) the employee's history of wildcat strikes, e.g., Butler Mfg. Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 1214 (1970)
(Purdom, Arb.);
6) the employee's length of service, e.g., Leewall Sportswear, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 1165 (1969)
(Dworkin, Arb.); and
7) the cause of the strike, e.g., Allen Indus., Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 1131 (1969) (Altrock, Arb.);
Donegal Steel Foundry, 37 Lab. Arb. 1001 (1961) (Brandschain, Arb.).
62. See cases cited in Note, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1657, 1668 n.62 (1972). One commentator
states that effective discipline penalizing strike participants in wildcat strikes is one of the most
effective ways of avoiding wildcats. See Mangum, Taming Wildcat Strikes, 1960 HARV. Bus. REv.
88, 96.
63. Selective discharge under such circumstances is regarded as discriminatory, arbitrary,
and capricious. See cases cited in Note, Reaction to the Wildcat Strike-The Employer's Dilemma,
20 CASE W.L. REV. 423, 432 n.46 (1969). An employer will be allowed to administer unequal
penalties on individuals who have instigated or taken a particularly active role in the wildcat. Id.
at 430 and cases cited therein. Arbitrators have approved harsher treatment for union officials
considering them presumptive leaders who have greater responsibility to refrain from strike action
and better knowledge of obligations created by a no strike pledge. See, e.g., Union Tank Car Co.,
38 Lab. Arb. 1144, 1149 (1962) (Davey, Arb.); Philco Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 889 (1962) (Marshall,
Arb.); Union Tank Car Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 928, 938 (1962) (Klamon, Arb.); Publisher's Ass'n, 36
Lab. Arb. 706, 708-09 (1961) (Seitz, Arb.); Borden Chem. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 325, 328 (1959) (Wal-
len, Arb.).
The National Labor Relations Board policy is not to permit questions of the equality of disci-
pline to cloud the fact that each participant in the strike individually breached the agreement, and
his/her individual breach is not cured because the employer selected certain strikers for reinstate-
ment and not others. See, e.g., Lenscraft Optical Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 807, 46 L.R.R.M. 1412
(1960); American Gillette Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1958); California Cotton Co-Op Ass'n, 110
N.L.R.B. 1494, 35 L.R.R.M. 1390 (1954); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 873,32
L.R.R.M. 1182, rev'd 217 F.2d 366 (1953); United Elec. Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768, 777 (1949).
64. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), noted in Shearer, supra
note 52 at 52-59; 35 ALB. L. REv. 410 (1971); 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 214 (1970); 9 DUQ. L. REv.
328 (1970-71); 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 143 (1970); 84 HARv. L. REv. 30, 192 (1970); 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 526 (1971). For criticism of labor injunctions in general see, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR IN-
JUNCTION 201 (1930); Anderson, Disadvantages of Injunctions in Industrial Disputes, 1975 NnW
ZEALAND L.J. 179, 182.
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injunctive relief.65 Perhaps the most economical remedy is for manage-
ment to avoid the wildcat strike by developing a sound labor relation-
ship with local union members.66 The Supreme Court, in Carbon Fuel
Co. v. UMWA, has removed the inappropriate remedy of a damage suit
against the parent union from the arsenal of potential remedies avail-
able to an employer for a local's unauthorized strike.
65. See New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Local 1418,49 L.R.R.M. 2941 (E.D. La. 1962); Ruppert v.
Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958); In re Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, 15 Lab.
Arb. 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951); Cloak, Suit & Shift Mfgrs. Inc., 5 Lab. Arb. 372 (1946) (Poletti,
Arb.).
66. See Shearer, supra note 52, at 69. A management which fails to observe sound personnel
policies and seeks to solve a wildcat strike problem by discipline alone increases the chances of
more subtle employee retaliation. See Mangum, supra note 62, at 96.
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